Command Responsibility for War Crimes by unknown
Command Responsibility for War Crimes
Citing the principle of command responsibility established by several
post-World War II international tribunals,' various commentators have
suggested that high American military and political leaders were re-
sponsible for the many unordered war crimes committed by low-level
troops in the Indochina War.2 The allegation is difficult to assess,
partly because the post-war precedents left the principle's meaning
unclear, and partly because the applicability of the precedents to Amer-
ican defendants in American courts is an unsettled issue of domestic
law. In the only command responsibility prosecution brought against
an American officer during the Indochina War, the court-martial of
Captain Ernest Medina, the laws of war played only a minor and am-
biguous role, and the defendant was acquitted. a Thus the law on com-
1. Most of the tribunals which applied the principle are mentioned in a discussion
of command responsibility in 15 UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, LAW RFI'ORTS
OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 65-76 (H.M.S.O. 1945-1948) [hereinafter cited as UNLR).
That a commander is responsible for subordinate crimes does not of course relieve the
subordinate perpetrators of their direct responsibility for the crimes. Though coin-
manders are also responsible for subordinate crimes which they have directly ordered,
the term "command responsibility" refers throughout this Note only to liability for sub-
ordinate crimes committed either under no order or tinder the order of someone other
than the defendant-commander in question. This Note does not deal with a commander's
duty to investigate and punish crimes after their commission. Nor does it deal with
theories by which a commander who merely "passes on" an illegal order from his su.
periors to his subordinates may become directly liable for "ordering" subordinate crimes.
On the latter problem, see U.S. DE'. OF TIE ARMY, INTERNATIONAL LAW 242 (lamph. No.
27-161-2, 1962).
2. For discussion of this suggestion, see, e.g., T. TAYLOR, NUREMBERG AND VITrNAM:
AN AMERICAN TRAGEDY 172-82 (1970); Coburn & Cowan, The War Criminals Hedge Their
Bets, Village Voice, Dec. 4, 1969; Hoopes, The Nuremberg Suggestion, Tim WAsmNT'n
MONTHLY, Jan. 1970, at 18-21; Coburn & Cowan, Letters, id., Feb. 1970, at 4-55; Falk,
Sonimy: War Crimes and Individual Responsibility, TRANSACTION, Jan. 1970, at 38.
3. Medina, company captain of the units involved in the My Lai Massacre, was
charged with the "premeditated murder" of "no less than 100" Vietnamese Iloncom-
battants, under Art. 118 (murder) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (hereinafter
cited as UCMJ], 10 U.S.C. 918 (1970). He was not charged with breach of the inter-
national laws of war as recognized by Article 18, U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 818 (1970).
After hearing the evidence, which indicated that Medina was not at the scene of the
massacre, though he was close-by and in radio communication with his troops, the
military judge, Col. Kenneth Howard, dismissed the murder charge but instructed the
jury on the lesser included Code offense of involuntary manslaughter, Art. 119(b)(l),
UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. 919(b)(1) (1970). For conviction the judge required the jury to satisfy
itself that Medina was "actually aware" that his men were "improperly killing non-
combattants," and that, after acquiring such knowledge, he did not even attempt to halt
the killing. Medina was acquitted on Sept. 22, 1971. On the acquittal and jury instruc-
tions, see Bigart, Medina Found Not Guilty of All Charges on My Lai, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 23, 1971, at 1, cols. 3-4, and Hammer, Medina: Another of tile My Lai Guiltless,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1971, § IV, at 6, cols. 1-7. See generally M. MCCARTHY, MEIINA
(1972). Whether the instructions accorded with accepted interpretations of involuntary
manslaughter may be doubted. See note 60 infra. The instructions clearly diverged from
many interpretations of command responsibility found in international cases on tile laws
of war, see pp. 1278-87 infra, a point made strenuously by Taylor, The Course of Military
Justice, N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1972, at 39, cols. 3-7. Whether Judge Howard should have
conformed his instructions to the laws of war remains an open question, however, given
that Medina was charged only with UCMJ forms of homicide. See pp. 1289.91 infra
and note 54 infra. If the Medina instructions are accepted as a proper reading of In-
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mand responsibility emerges from this war in a no more satisfactory
state than it had reached after World War II.
After analyzing command responsibility into its basic elements, and
surveying the confusion of current law, this Note presents and defends
a set of new command responsibility rules for prospective application
in American courts, and briefly suggests the several ways in which these
rules might become law.
I. Current Law: Structure and Defects
A. International Precedents and the "Elements" of
Command Responsibility
The post-war tribunals rarely bothered to make a formal analysis of
the offense they were creating, relying instead on brief and conclusory
descriptions.5 Most "decisions" were attempts by a trial forum to mar-
shal all the possible legal, moral, and evidentiary support for its ver-
dict. Indeed many of the war crimes tribunals left no written record
or opinion.0 There is no international legislature to update and clarify
voluntary manslaughter, and if American commanders are to be charged for their sub.
ordinates' crimes only under UCMJ forms of homicide, command responsibility will
rarely attach for crimes neither witnessed nor ordered by the defendant-officer. See "I'aylor,
supra. For adverse comment on the Medina "precedent," see The Medina .cquittal
(Editorial), N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 1971, at 40, col. 1.
4. The U.N. Commission recognized that the post.war cases left the offense in an
unsettled state, see 4 UNLR 95. Commentary on the offense has been relatively sparse
and has not proposed specific formulations of command responsibility which courts or
legislatures might adopt. For a thorough and balanced discussion of alleged American
war crimes in Vietnam, and of the possible responsibility of high-level officers for some
of these, see O'Brien, The Law of War, Command Responsibility and Vietnan, 60 GEo.
L.J. 605 (1972). For earlier commentary on command responsibility, see APPEMAN, MIU-
TARY TRIBUNALS AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 303-05 (1954); M. G~x-m_%sn'A, THE MODEMN
LAW OF LX.ao WARFARE 478-86 (1957); A. REEL, TitE CQSE OF GENErALL YA lIsarrA (1949);
Arens, Vicarious Punishment and War Crimes Prosecution: The Civil War or Alice
Through the Looking Glass, 1951 W.sh. UN v. L.Q. 62 (1951); Fairman, The Supreme
Court on Military Jurisdiction: Martial Rule in Hawaii and the Yamaishita Case, 59
HARv. L. REv. 833 (1946); Snyder, Liability for Negative Conduct, 35 VA. L REV. 446
(1949); Speyer, Les Crimes de guerre par omission, REVUE DE DRorT PENvAL Er DE cait-
INOLOGIE 903 (1949-50).
5. For example, the United States Supreme Court, in In re Yamashita. described con-
mand responsibility as "an affirmative duty to take such measures as [are] within his
power and appropriate in the circumstances to protect prisoners of war and the civilian
population." 327 U.S. 1. 16 (1946). Note also the legal instruction given the tribunal in
Trial of Meyer, 4 UNLR 97, 108:
[Has the accused] wilfully failed in his duty as a military commander to prevent.
or to take such action as the circumstances required to endeavor to prevent the
killing of prisoners... ?
These brief formulations are typical in their use of undefined legal terms, e.g., "wil-
fully" and "appropriate."
6. This is the case with many of the "minor" war crimes trials reported in UNLR.
On the varying practices of tribunals in rendering judgments and opinions, see the UN
Commission's discussion at 15 UNLR 20. Even if well reasoned and fully reported. the
cases would not constitute a body of "precedent" in the usual sense. International
criminal law recognizes treaties and customary practice, as well as cases, and the prin-
ciple of stare decisis is followed only loosely. See 15 UNLR 5-22.
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precedents and no international criminal court to enforce them or
resolve their inconsistencies.7
Nonetheless, command responsibility has a formal structure worthy
of analysis. A form of complicity" through omission, it has four basic
elements: status, mental standard, mental object, and the duty to inter-
vene. Consider, for instance, the command responsibility rule in the
U.S. Army Field Manual. 9
[If a war crime is committed], [t]he commander of occupied ter-
ritory is responsible if he has actual knowledge, or should have
knowledge, through reports received by him or through other
means, that troops or other persons subject to his control are
about to commit a war crime, and he fails to take the necessary and
reasonable steps to insure compliance with the law of war.
Status refers to the hierarchical relationship which a "commander"
must bear to a "subordinate" for the former to incur a duty to inter-
vene against the latter's crimes. Thus the Manual rule applies to a
"commander of occupied territory" with regard to subordinates who
are "troops or other persons subject to his control." The duty to inter-
vene arises only at the point where the mental elements are satisfied-
in the Manual rule, where a commander "should have knowledge"
(minimal mental standard) "that [subordinates] are about to commit
a war crime" (mental object). While the mental object identifies the
event or prospect against which a commander is obligated to intervene,
7. The postwar international tribunals were merely temporary organs established by
the Allies to try Axis military and political figures for war crimes and for crimes against
peace and humanity. The permanent International Court of Justice, the judicial organ
of the United Nations, has no criminal jurisdiction over individuals. For a suggestion
that the United Nations should nevertheless have investigated American war crimes in
Vietnam, see Russell, My Lai Massacre-The Need for an International investigation,
58 CALIF. L. REV. 703 (1970). On the international legal jurisdiction of national courts
to enforce the laws of war against foreigners, see generally Carnegie, Jurisdiction over
Violations of the Laws and Customs of War, 1963 BRIT. YER BOOK INT'L LAW 402 (1963).
8. The term "complicity" must be loosely construed here. First, since death is typi-
cally a permissible punishment for any war crime before an international tribunal, tile
classification of criminal parties has no necessary significance for potential penalty.
Second, the classification of criminal parties varies among different nations' systems of
domestic criminal law, and it cannot be assumed that international law incorporates any
single classification. Third, it is logically possible to consider command responsibility
as an inchoate crime, e.g., to find a commander responsible for allowing a high risk
of crime to develop among his subordinates, even though no subordinate crime was
actually committed. While no postwar case expressly recognized this possibility, neither
did any case expressly foreclose it. Finally, the commander's liability is not always de-
rived from the liability or potential liability of a criminal subordinate; it may, rather,
flow directly from duties owed by the commander to the victims of the crimes. See note
13 inIra.
9. UNITED STATES DE'P'T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27-10: TA LAW OF LAND
WARFARE, para. 501 (1956). The Manual rule no doubt attempts to restate international
law, and provisions from military manuals are "persuasive," though not "binding" state-
ments of law before international tribunals, see U.N. Commission at 15 UNLR 21, but
the rule is quoted here only to illustrate the element scheme suggested in the text.
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the duty to intervene itself indicates in what way, or how vigorously,
the commander must intervene. Thus the Manual rule provides that
he "take the necessary and reasonable steps to insure compliance with
the law of war."
1. Status
The post-war cases permit only broad generalizations concerning the
status relationship necessary for intervention duties to arise. First, com-
mand responsibility is not peculiar to military officers, but may also
apply to police officials, civilian administrators, and cabinet officials.10
Second, staff officers and advisors with no operational authority over
the criminal subordinates in question have no affirmative duty to
repress their crimes. 1 Third, under certain circumstances, a "com-
mander" may apparently be liable for crimes of persons over whom his
authority by national law or bureaucratic practice is limited or non-
existent. Thus, war crimes by military personnel were imputed to cabi-
net ministers having no authority in national law over military or pris-
oner of war (POW) affairs;'12 and commanders in charge of occupied
territory or of POW's were found responsible for protecting helpless
POW's and civilians from injury regardless of its source, not merely
from "war crimes" or from the excesses of the commanders' subordi-
nates.'
3
10. See, e.g., Trial of Schonfeld, 11 UNLR 63 (police officials); Trial of Pohl, 5 TRIALS
OF WTAR CRiMINALs BEFORE THE NURaMBERG 'MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL
LAw No. 10 (1946-49, USGPO 1952) at 1054 (defendant Munmenthey, a cihilian adminis-
trator) [hereinafter cited as TWC]. On the responsibility of civilian administrators and
cabinet ministers, even those ministers unconcerned with military affairs, see JLzD.%t&%,r
OF THE INTERNATIONAL 'MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR TIlE FAR EAST, Nov. 4-12,. 1948. at 28-32
(1949) [hereinafter cited as TOKYO JUDGENTJ, discussed in Horwitz, The Tohyo Trial,
465 INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION 571, 579 (1950). [Because the Toklo Judgment and the
dissents and concurrences are rarely available even in major university libraries, reference
to them will be accompanied by reference to secondary materials which quote or ac-
curately paraphrase the originals.] The American President could also be found guilty
of command responsibility, for there is no "head of state" exemption from war crimes
liability. See, e.g., Nuremberg Charter, Art. 7; Tokyo Charter, Art. 6; and Allied Control
Council Law No. 10, Art. II-all reprinted in UNrrED NA'roNs WAR CRIMES COsMSSIO.N,
HISTORY OF -THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES CoMIssSIoN 271-72 (1948) [hereinafter
cited as UN HISTORY].
11. See, e.g., Trial of List, II TWC 759, 1281-86; High Command Trial, 10 TWC 1.
I1 TWC at 629-90.
12. The Tokyo Tribunal convicted and executed Hirota Koki of command responsi-
bility for war crimes committed while he was Foreign Minister of Japan. without na-
tional legal authority to repress the crimes. Though Hirota had sought to have the
criminality suppressed, he had accepted "assurances" front the War Ministry rather than
making independent investigation of continuing reports of crimes. The Tribunal held
that he had either to succeed at convincing the cabinet to suppress the crimes or to re-
sign from the cabinet. TOKYO JUDGMENT, supra note 10. at 1160.61, discussed in R. MNIrEAn,
VICTORs' JUSTICE: THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL 71-72 (1971).
13. High Command Trial, 11 TWC at 544-47; Trial of List, 11 TWC 759, 1260;
TOKYO JUDGMENT, supra note 10, at 28-32. excerpted at 15 UNLR 72-74. See also Essen
Lynching Trial, 1 UNLR 88. Cf. also In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 15 (1946). That af-
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2. The Two Mental Elements
Tribunals and commentators have typically divided command re-
sponsibility rules into those which require actual knowledge of the
subordinate crime and those which admit constructive, knowledge.1 4
Once accomplishing this classification, analysis has usually ended.
While important, this distinction should not dominate interpreta-
tion of the offense, or even of its mental elements.l 5 When a rule cre-
ates a naked "duty to know"-as does the Army Manual's unadorned
phrase "should have knowledge"16-a tribunal may of course measure
the duty against any normative test: e.g., a reasonable man test, or some
weaker or stronger standard. Once this test is selected, however, con-
structive knowledge is subject to only two sensible interpretations.
First, it may mean a duty to make reasonable (or other) inferences from
actually known facts, a conviction implying that the mental object
firmative duties may be imposed because the defendant bears either a pertinent status
relationship to subordinate perpetrators of criminal acts or a pertinent status relation-
ship to the victims of injurious acts may be important for determining U.S. treaty ob-
ligations to create and enforce the offense of command responsibility against its own
officers. The 1949 Geneva Conventions require the U.S. to legislate against and prosecute
those who have "committed" or "ordered to be committed . . . grave breaches" of the
Conventions. Art. 129, Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter cited as POW
Convention], and Art. 146, Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons
in Time of War of Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T..A.S. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [herein-
after cited as Civilian Convention]. Such language does not include failure to prevent
or to suppress grave breaches committed by subordinates; nor is the offense of com-
mand responsibility itself a grave breach, for the latter-so far as homicide is con-
cerned-is defined as "wilful killing." Art. 130, POW Convention; Art. 147, Civilian
Convention. But the Conventions do mention protective duties owed to POW's and
civilians. Art. 13 of the POW Convention classifies as a "serious breach . . . [a]ny tin-
lawful act or omission by the Detaining Power causing death or seriously endangering the
health of a prisoner of war in its custody" (emphasis added). Article 16 of the Civilian
Convention obligates signatory nations to "protect [persons exposed to grave danger]
against pillage and ill-treatment." Cf. Paust, Legal Aspects of the My Lai ldent: A
Response to Professor Rubin, 50 OREl. L. REv. 138, 149 (1971), and R61ing, The Law
of War and The National Jurisdiction Since 1945, 100 RECOEIL DES COURS DE L'ACADEIIE
DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL DE LA HAVE 323, 381 (1960).
14. See, e.g., High Command Trial, II TWC at 543-45; Trial of Pohl, 5 TWC 195, 1011;
UN Commission, 4 UNLR 95; Rbling, supra note 13, at 380; Appleman, supra note 4, at
305; Taylor, supra note 3.
15. Because, arguably, a commander found wrongfully ignorant of the subordinate
crime does not deserve conviction where legally valid excuses would have relieved him
from intervening even if he had known of the crime, invocation of "constructive knowl-
edge" does not allow a tribunal simply to ignore the definition of intervention duties.
Further, a simple division of command responsibility rules between actual and con-
structive knowledge obscures a third possible mental standard: approval of, or intent
to encourage, the subordinate crimes. By definition this standard redtces the interven-
tion duty to a minimum, for a commander could not be convicted if he had in any
way manifested his disapproval of the subordinate crime. But support for this mental
standard is very sparse. While the High Command Tribunal occasionally noted that a
particular defendant not only knew, "but approved of" the subordinate crimes, it did
not suggest that approval was a necessary element for conviction. High Command Trial,
11 TWC at 568, 627. See also Trial of Kesselring, 8 UNLR 9. where a commander's re-
sponsibility for subordinate abuse of the commander's orders was charged tinder a theory
of "incitement."
16. See p. 1276 supra.
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specified in the rule was thus reasonably inferable. Second, a duty to
know may mean a duty to make reasonable (or other) investigation
of actually known, "suspicious" facts indicating the possible existence
of the mental object, a conviction implying that such an investigation
would have apprised the defendant of the mental object.
To appreciate the importance of this distinction, suppose the mental
object specified in a rule is the fact that "subordinate war crimes are
occurring." Expecting that they will confront only unarmed civilians,
a commander sends his troops into a village and monitors their prog-
ress from a two-way radio installation ten miles away. Over the radio,
he hears sporadic gun fire and what might be either laughing or scream-
ing. He does nothing. It happens that, within three minutes of this in-
cident, his troops massacred all the civilians in the village. If the com-
mander "should have inferred" the crimes from the gun-shot sounds,
he is responsible for all the murders: He should have communicated
immediate orders to cease shooting. If, however, he "should have in-
vestigated" the gun-shot sounds, these being merely suspicious facts,
he might escape responsibility for some or all of the murders by show-
ing that a reasonable (or other) investigation would have taken some
time. By contrast, if the commander had had no radio communication
with his troops when the murders occurred, and thus no awareness of
facts from which the crimes' occurrence might have been inferred or
on which an investigation might have been based, conviction could not
be founded on constructive knowledge.
If, in this last case, a tribunal nonetheless convicted on grounds the
commander "should have known" about the crimes, it would actually
be misreading, or rewriting, the mental object requirement. The tri-
bunal would in fact mean: (a) Before sending his troops on the mis-
sion, the commander knew or should have known (by inference or in-
vestigation) that there was a risk or high likelihood his subordinates
would commit war crimes-this risk being a new mental object; (b)
Such knowledge of this risk raised a duty to intervene against it-e.g.,
by staying near a radio, by warning his men to behave correctly, by
accompanying them into the field, etc.; (c) Had these intervention
duties been met, the crimes would have been prevented or, at the
least, detected and instantly repressed.
To use the term "constructive knowledge" in such a case deprives
the concept of clear boundaries and wrongly implies that the choice
between actual and constructive knowledge is the sole determinant of
a rule's power to trace liability to very high-level commanders for un-
ordered crimes committed by very low-level subordinates. In fact, as
1279
The Yale Law Journal
the example above shows, the stringency of a command responsibility
rule turns largely on its specification of the mental object.
This may take three forms. First, the rule may impose intervention
duties only after the commander has the requisite knowledge that a
specific crime-particularized by place, time, perpetrator, and type-
is occurring or is planned. Attaching constructive knowledge to this
mental object makes little difference: High-level commanders will
rarely know facts from which inference or investigation would suggest
the occurrence or imminence of a specific low-level subordinate crime.
Second, the rule may also impose intervention duties when the com-
mander has the requisite knowledge that a subordinate group or unit
is engaged in a criminal policy or organized routine, e.g., of torturing
captured officers for information. Requisite knowledge of a criminal
policy is, by definition, requisite knowledge that a certain type of crime
will predictably occur under specifiable contingencies. It is unnecessary
that the commander have known, or have had a duty to know, that any
specific criminal incident-particularized by place, time, perpetrator,
and type-was occurring or definitely about to occur; and it is not suf-
ficient that the commander knew merely that the unit in question had
a high "crime rate" or was generally unruly.
Third, a rule may impose intervention duties as soon as a com-
mander realizes that subordinate crimes are, for whatever reason, un-
acceptably likely to occur in the future. Here the mental object is the
risk of future crime, and the rule must specify what degree or kind of
risk is "unacceptable." With this mental object the distinction between
actual and constructive knowledge virtually dissolves. Unless informed
of the odds in a fair game of chance, a person never "actually" knows
the likelihood of uncertain future events, but can only make an esti-
mate on the basis both of facts known to him and of his awareness of
ignorance or uncertainty about other relevant facts and circumstances.
A tribunal can objectively determine the defendant's awareness or
ignorance of particular facts and circumstances, but cannot objectively
ascertain the inferences about risks which he actually drew from them.
Thus a tribunal has little choice but to apply some normative test:
Given the information he knew, should the commander have concluded
that the risk of crime was unacceptable?
It is by specifying risks of crime as one of its mental objects that a
rule can most readily create expansive intervention duties and hold
high-level officers responsible for the unordered crimes of low-level
troops. Risks of crime are often caused by precisely those large-scale
factors which high-level commanders know about and directly control:
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Choice of strategies, tactics, or weapons; systems of recruitment and
training; quality of leadership in the officer corps; the general state
of discipline; etc.
The post-war tribunals reached no consensus in specifying the men-
tal elements of command responsibility. Predictably, the cases adopting
a mental object of specific crime (and rejecting any more expansive
formulation) convicted only officers close in rank and geographic loca-
tion to the subordinate perpetrators of crime, regardless of whether
actual or constructive knowledge was chosen as the mental standard.17
Typically these tribunals were dealing with only a few defendant-com-
manders and a few subordinate criminal incidents. In the larger and
more famous tribunals, the formulation of the mental object was neces-
sarily broadened. Many defendant-commanders were joined in a single
proceeding, each charged with liability for dozens, even hundreds, of
subordinate crimes, and neither prosecutors nor judges were prepared
to explore the actual knowledge, or duty to know, of each defendant
regarding each specific crime. Thus the Nuremberg Subsequent Pro-
ceedings chose criminal policies as a mental object,18 vacillating only
17. In Trial of Tanaka, 5 UNLR 66, a Japanese general was charged with respon.
sibility for the illegal trial and execution of an American POW by the general's sub-
ordinates while the general was on a leave of absence from his headquarters. The
conviction was reversed on appeal, id. at 70, because there was insufficient e~idence the
defendant had had "wrongful knowledge" of the subordinate crime charged. Had the
appeals tribunal instead adopted a mental object of risks of future crime, the fact that
the general apparently absented himself from headquarters without leaving behind ade-
quate safeguards might have supported conviction. For an apparent application of this
theory, see Trial of Sawada, 5 UNLR 1. The Trial of Schonfeld, 11 UNLR 63, also
adopted a mental object of specific subordinate crimes. Subordinates of the accused, a
German police commandant, had executed three allied POW's in his absence. While the
tribunal was instructed to convict if the accused "had reasonable grounds for supposing
that his men were going to indulge in committing a war crime, jd. at 70. the Judge
Advocate explained that the accused "could hardly have reasonable grounds" if the
subordinates had not "apprised" the accused ahead of time of their plans. id. at 71. The
tribunal was thus not free to decide that the accused knew there was a general risk
of subordinate crimes.
In the Trial of Student, 4 UNLR 118, the Commander-in-Chief of German forces
in the 1941 battle for Crete was charged with responsibility for a number of scattered
subordinate crimes committed over a two month period. The crimes did not consti-
tute a policy or an established pattern, and there was no way-given his elevated rank
and distance from the many battlefields-that the accused could have been aware of the
occurrence or imminence of any of the specific crimes; thus conviction depended oii
adoption of risks of crime as a nental object. While the trial forun convicted on some
counts, all convictions were reversed on appeal. In the Trial of Meyer. 4 UNLR 97, the
accused commander was found responsible for subordinate crimes committed at his head-
quarters, probably because proper inferences from, or investigations of, known facts
would have revealed the occurrence of these crimes to him, but he was acquitted of
responsibility for subordinate crimes committed on a mission he did not accompan).
even though his pre-mission instructions to those subordinates were inflammatory and
clearly created a risk that the crimes would be committed.
18. Note, for instance, how the mental object is described in the Ohlendorf Tribunal'sjudgment on SS Brigadier General Jost:
The record clearly demonstrates .. . that as Chief of Eimsatzgruppe A, the de-
fendant was aware of the criminal purpose to which that organization was put,
and, as its commander, cannot escape responsibility for its acts.
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in the choice between actual and constructive knowledge as the men-
tal standard. 19 Other tribunals, however, went further and selected
risks as a mental object. First, some tribunals convicted commanders
who had created the risks by their own actions, e.g., by ordering espe-
cially aggressive action without stipulating that criminal abuses were
not intended,2 0 or by launching a mission which, in the circumstances,
involved a high risk of subordinate criminality.21 Second, commanders
were required to infer from the past commission of crimes that the
future occurrence of similar crimes was probable.22 Third, some tri-
4 TWC 1, 512 (emphasis added). Other Nuremberg Subsequent Proceedings adopting a ,
mental object of criminal policies for command responsibility were: Trial of Brandt, 1
TWC 1; Trial of Pohl, 5 TWO 195; Trial of Milch, 7 UNLR 27 (reported also at 2
TWO); Trial of List, 11 TWC 759; High Command Trial, 10 TWC 1.
The rejection of risks as a mental object may be inferred from some of the results.
Thus the Pohl Tribunal acquitted defendant Tschentscher, as SS company commander,
of responsibility for his subordinates' participation in the murder of thousands of non-
combattants in Eastern Poland and the Ukraine because "the participation of sub-
ordinates under his command ...was not of sufficient magnitude or duration to con-
stitute notice to the defendant, and thus give him an opportunity to control their ac-
tions." 5 TWVC at 1011. Having earlier in his career instructed troop units on Nazi
racial policies in occupied areas, id. at 1010, Tschentscher probably knew upon assuim-
ing command that there was a high risk his subordinates would become involved in
illegal acts if he did not guard vigilantly against the possibility, but the Tribunal (lid
not mention any duty to intervene against general risks of future crime. In the Trial
of Mich, 7 UNLR 27, a high-level administrator was acquitted of responsibility for
illegal medical experiments conducted by his subordinates on concentration camp In-
mates. He was totally ignorant of the details of these experiments because he had
totally delegated authority over the program to the subordinates, and his acquittal was
grounded on the absence of "guilty knowledge." 7 UNLR at 36-37. He was aware of
no particular "clues" of illegal activities which would raise duties of inference or in-
vestigation; compare cases creating duties to investigate or infer, note 19 infra. The
total delegation itself might have been found to raise unacceptable risks of crime, a
theory unexplored by the Milch Judgment but expressly rejected in Judge Phillips'
concurring opinion. 7 UNLR at 62-63. On this theory, see p. 1283 infra. In the Trial
of Rauer, 4 UNLR 113, a mental object of risks was also rejected. The defendant was
charged with three successive crimes committed by a unit of his subordinates. While
the prosecution suggested that the accused's behavior prior to all three created a risk
they would be committed, id. at 115, the tribunal convicted him of only the last two
crimes, presumably on the theory that inference from or investigation of the first death
would have revealed a subordinate criminal policy.
19. Compare High Command Trial, 11 TWC at 543-45, iwith Trial of Brandt, 4
UNLR at 92-93, 1 TWC I, and Trial of Pohl, 5 TWC 195, 1053-54, which imposed
duties of inference from or investigation of known "suspicious" facts which were
spelled out in the opinions.
20. See, e.g., Trial of Yamashita, 4 UNLR 1, 31 (order on suppressing guerillas, al-
legation of prosecution); High Command Trial, 11 TWC at 560-61 (Barbarossa Juris-
diction Order); Trial of Kesselring, 8 UNLR 9 (reprisal orders subject to abuse); but
cf. High Command Trial, 11 TWC at 535, 628-29, involving acquittal of commanders
who had issued or passed on legal orders raising a high risk of criminal abuse by
subordinates. Orders themselves have been held illegal because they created high risks
of subordinate crime. See Trial of Moehle, 9 UNLR 75. It is usually difficult to deter-
mine whether a tribunal finds the order itself illegal or merely subject to risks of sub-
ordinate criminal abuse which the commander has a duty to minimize.
21. See, e.g., Trial of Masao, 11 UNLR 56.
22. ToKYO JUDGMENT, supra note 10, at 28-32, excerpted at 15 UNLR 74. Actually,
the Tokyo Judgment required that commanders infer future risks from past crimes of
which they had only constructive knowledge, id. This odd wedding of constructive
knowledge to a mental object of risks is unnecessarily confusing. A commander need not
be actually or constructively aware of particular suspicious facts, e.g., the commission
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bunals found that failure to supervise or keep a check on subordinates
might raise unacceptable risks of crime. Thus, in a prominent convic-
tion affirmed by the United States Supreme Court, the Japanese Gen-
eral Yamashita was found responsible for literally hundreds of crimes
and criminal policies committed or engaged in by his subordinates in
the Philippines. Because Yamashita maintained almost no communi-
cation with his subordinates, and there was no evidence he actually
knew about these crimes, the case is commonly cited for the proposi-
tion that command responsibility incorporates "constructive knowl-
edge."2 3 This is a confused reading of the case. Yamashita apparently
was aware of no particular facts which might raise a duty to infer or
investigate specific crimes or criminal policies. Rather, the military
commission and the Supreme Court held that his total ignorance, and
the complete delegation of authority associated with it, themselves
raised unacceptable general risks of future subordinate criminality,
those crimes becoming chargeable to him as soon as they occurred.2 4
By imposing duties of supervision and control, even where a com-
mander is aware of no particular facts indicating that his subordinates
are engaging in crimes, Yamashita accomplishes a greater expansion
of command responsibility than would a mere recognition of "con-
structive knowledge."2 5 Going even further, the Tokyo Tribunal
of past crimes, to conclude that risks of future crimes exist. Rather. he can conclude
from his very ignorance, detachment, and isolation that his subordinates, unchecked
and unsupervised, are likely to slip into criminal activity. See pp. 1282-84 & note 79 infra.
23. See, e.&. UN Commission, 15 UNLR 63-76; Rling, supra note 13. at 379-80; and
M. GREENsPAN, supra note 4, at 483. The Yamashita Trial is reported at 4 UNLR 1.
aff'd sub nom. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
24. The prosecution concededly phrased its allegations in terms of wrongful ignorance.
and the Judgment did mention a "duty to discover" subordinate crimes, 4 UNLR at 35,
but the trial record did not present clear proof that Yamashita was actually aware of
suspicious facts which would have triggered duties of inference or investigation into
the criminal policies adopted by his subordinates. See summary of evidence, 4 UNLR at
18-23. Thus it does not appear that the tribunal found that Yamashita had failed to
"follow up" any particular clue pointing to existing subordinate criminality as had
tribunals convicting other commanders for breaching duties to "know" about on-going
subordinate criminal policies. See cases cited note 19 supra. Rather, the tribunal found
that Yamashita's failure to maintain general oversight and close control of his troops
raised risks that they would get out of hand. He breached Intervention duties, not
duties of inference from or investigation of particular facts. The Supreme Court de-
cision is consistent with this reading of the case. The Court said that a commander
must "control" his troops so that subordinate crimes will not "result," 327 U.S. at 15,
which indicates that risk of future crime, and not merely the present occurrence of
crime, raises intervention duties. Further, the Court's very vague holding makes no
reference to constructive knowledge of existing crimes or policies: "[Yamashita had] an
affirmative duty to take such measures as were within his power and appropriate in
the circumstances to protect prisoners of war and the civilian p.pulation.' Id. at 16.
The military law precedents cited by the Court for this proposition involved instances
where commanders had actual knowledge of the subordinate crimes charged to them.
Id. at 16 n.3.
25. If read as a "constructive knowledge" case, Yamashita merely holds that a com-
mander is presumed to know of subordinate crimes which have become part of criminal
policies engulfing almost his entire command. Since such pervasive and flagrant crim-
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found that unacceptable risks were raised by general supervisory de-
faults well short of Yamashita's nearly total abdication of command
authority.2 6
Unfortunately, however, none of the tribunals adopting risks as a
mental object attempted to summarize in general terms all the levels
or kinds of risk which are unacceptable. Because each dealt only with
the particular risk in the evidence before it, the law was left in an
unsettled condition.
3. The Duty to Intervene
The vigor with which a commander must intervene against the
specified mental object may be characterized in two broad ways.
Either some general normative standard-such as "reasonably" or
"diligently"-may be applied; or an absolute duty to eliminate the
mental object may be established, subject to expressly defined excus-
ing conditions which either extinguish the duty entirely or modify
its demands.
Arguably, command responsibility is a type of criminal "negli-
gence," so that a duty of "reasonable" intervention should be re-
quired.2 7 But, because the term "reasonable" simply invites a balanc-
inality is rare, and command ignorance of it more rare still, the holding would have few
practical applications. By contrast, if read to impose general supervisory duties, the holding
may result in command responsibility for subordinate crimes which are relatively few
and scattered.
26. The Tokyo Judgment stated that cabinet members, military commanders, civilian
administrators "concerned with the well being of POW's," and officials having "direct
and immediate control" over POW's, have duties in
establishing and securing the continuous and efficient working of a system ap-
propriate . . . to secure proper treatment of prisoners and to prevent their ill-
treatment . . . . [The Commander] has a duty to ascertain that the system is
working and if he neglects to do so, he is responsible. He does not discharge his
duty merely by instituting an appropriate system and thereafter neglecting to
learn of its application.
TOKYO JUDGMENT, supra note 10, at 28-32, excerpted at 15 UNLR at 72-74. See also
Trial of Sawada, 5 UNLR 1, where a commander was found responsible for crimes coin-
mitted by his subordinates while he was absent from his headquarters, the implication
being that such absence creates unacceptable risks of subordinate criminality unless the
commander has left careful instructions and delegated authority prudently. But see
Trial of Tanaka, supra note 17.
27. The U.S. Army Field Manual uses the ambiguous phrase "reasonable and neces-
sary," see p. 1276. The term "necessary" is dropped in U.S. DEIr. OF TE ARMY, AtMY
SuBjECr SCHEDULE No. 27-I, at 10 (1970). See also O'Brien, supra note 4, at 627-29, who
contends that the "reasonableness" standard determines the contours of command re-
sponsibility according to the fact situations which prevailed in previous command re-
sponsibility convictions. Id. at 629. Given that command responsibility cases are few
and far between, and that questions of responsibility arise in an infinite number of
conceivable fact situations, this suggestion is of doubtful practicality. In tort law, the
reasonableness of a defendant's behavior is determined by a jury instructed about the
general attributes of a reasonable man, not about the fact situations which resulted in
liability in "similar" cases in the past. RsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283, Com-
ment C.
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ing of social costs and benefits, 28 consistent adjudication would re-
quire that judges roughly agree on the relative value of war crimes
suppression, military success, and exact obedience to superior orders.
It is doubtful that such a consensus exists even within a single nation's
armed forces.29 In establishing standards of conduct, international war
crimes law cannot merely incorporate reconized community norms,
for none exist.
In fact, none of the tribunals invoked a reasonableness standard. Fre-
quently the intervention duty was formulated in terms so ambiguous
and question-begging as to establish no standard at all.30 Other tri-
bunals imposed liability only if the defendant-commander did virtually
nothing to eliminate the pertinent mental object; 3' still others re-
quired more than "reasonable" intervention.3 2
Nor were the cases entirely clear or consistent in identifying excusing
conditions which might extinguish or modify the intervention duty.
Defendants raised three types of excuses: lack of physical control over
subordinates, lack of legal authority over subordinates, and military
necessity.
Physical control:33 On assuming command, Yamashita inherited ill-
28. See, e.g., R~srAATEMENT (SECo n) OF Toars § 283, Comment E. & 1q 291-93. The
notion of reasonableness directs a jury member to a "community standard" of conduct
in weighing the conflicting interests involved. Id. at § 283. Comment C.
29. O'Brien is more confident on this point, but does not explain why:
Ernst Feilchenfeld, a respected international law publicist, once suggested the nced
for a model "reasonable colonel" as the law of war counterpart to the common
law "reasonable man." Having taken all the rules and policy guidelines into account,
the judgment of command responsibility for war crimes turns on the standard of a
reasonable commander.
O'Brien, supra note 4, at 629.
30. In the Trial of Seeger, for instance, the tribunal was instructed as followvs by
the legal officer:
[I]t is for you with your members, using your military knowledge, going into the
whole of this evidence to say whether it is right to hold that General Seeger...
[was] required to do things whicl he failed to do and which amounted to a war
crime.
4 UNLR 88. See also the instructions in Trial of Meyer, 4 UNLR 97, 107-08. The Supreme
Court in Yamashita referred only to "measures .. .appropriate in the circumstances,"
327 U.S. at 16, leaving formulation of a standard of conduct to the trial forum. The
Military Commission had said that Yamashita had "failed to provide effective control
of his troops as was required by the circumstances." 4 UNLR 1, 35. But, absent a
standard of conduct, circumstances cannot "require" anything.
31. The High Command Tribunal, for instance, spoke of a "wanton. immoral dis-
regard of the action of his subordinates amounting to acquiescence." 11 TWC at 544.
32. The Tokyo Tribunal, for instance, required a commander to "be at the same
pains to ensure obedience to his orders [concerning protection of POW's] as he would
in respect of other orders he had issued of the first importance." ToKYo JUDCMEtiT,
supra note 10, excerpted at 15 UNLR 73 (emphasis added). In requiring commanders
to forestall the recurrence of war crimes, the Tribunal said responsibility would at-
tach if commanders "failed to take such steps as were within their power to prevent
the commission of such crimes in the future." Id. This, too, connotes a maximum effort.
33. The excuse of physical inability, properly construed, is not necessarily involved
simply because a defendant claims he could not do the "impossible." For instance, a
defendant might claim he "could not" stop a subordinate crime because he was unaware
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trained and mutinous troops, and the Allied invasion of the Philippines
cut his communications with many units. 34 Neither the Supreme Court
nor the military commission indicated whether he was implicitly ac-
quitted of those crimes the risk of which he was powerless to eliminate.
The prosecution had, however, argued that a powerless commander is
not excused from duties but, rather, has a duty to offer his resigna-
tion.35 Conceivably, therefore, Yamashita holds that a commander who
is incapable, for whatever reason, of controlling his subordinates must
offer to resign his command, or suffer responsibility for ensuing crimes.
Legal authority: As noted above,36 international law occasionally
attached commander "status" to a defendant whose authority to direct
the criminal subordinates in question, or to countermand illegal orders
issued to them by his superior or by independent officials, was limited
by national law or by customary bureaucratic practice. Apparently such
limits qualify-but do not eliminate-the defendant's duty to intervene
against the subordinates' crimes.37 The cases do not, however, make
clear just what intervention duties exist in such circumstances. Several
tribunals acquitted commanders who had protested the illegal orders
issued by their superiors.38 Attempts actually to countermand or cor-
rect illegal superior orders met a mixed judicial response,3 9 as did the
of it, a claim which goes to the mental elements of the offense, and does not assert
an excuse to the intervention duty. Similarly, that a defendant could not effectively
intervene at the time of the crime may be irrelevant if intervention was possible at tile
earlier point when he should have been aware of the risks of future crime.
34. For General Yamashita's persuasive testimony and other evidence on this point,
see 4 UNLR at 22-25.
35. Id. at 33.
36. See p. 1277 supra.
37. For instance, the High Command Tribunal concluded:
Under basic principles of command authority and responsibility, an officer who
merely stands by while his subordinates execute a criminal order of his superiors
which he knows is criminal violates a moral obligation under international law. By
doing nothing he cannot wash his hands of international responsibility .... Any
silent acquiescence in their enforcement by his-subordinates constitutes a criminal
act.
11 TWC at 512. The problem also arises where the order originates from a command
hierarchy separate from that of the defendant-commander or where a commander is
made liable for crimes committed by personnel who are not his subordinates under
national law. Concerned that commanders were being asked to do the impossible in
such circumstances, Judge Mfling, dissenting in part at Tokyo, urged that the defini-
tion of commander status closely track national law. The Far East Tribunal (Judgment
of B. R6ing, Nov. 12, 1948), at 61-62, discussed in Horwitz, supra note 1O, at 572. It Is
doubtful, however, that any general status definition applicable to a broad range of
bureaucratic circumstances can entirely eliminate the possibility that intervention duties
will be imposed on officers or officials who have only imperfect authority over the
subordinates in question. Thus the law must make clear in what respects qualified
authority alters a commander's intervention duties. On the related and much-discussed
problem of a subordinate's duty to disobey superior directives ordering perpetration of
crimes, see generally Y. DINSTEIN, THE DEFENSE OF "OBEDIENCE TO SUI'ERIOR ORDERS" IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1965).
38. See, e.g., Trial of Sawada, 5 UNLR 1; Velpke Children's Home Case, 7 UNLR 76;
High Command Trial, 11 TWC at 555-58.
39. Compare High Command Trial, 11 TWC at 564-65, 625-29 (defendants Hollidt and
Sperrle), with Trial of List, 11 TWC 759, 1297-1300 (defendant Dehner).
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proposition that commanders must protest or offer resignation. 40 Oddly
enough, no case addressed the equally important question whether a
commander must violate, alter, or protest legal superior orders which,
in the circumstances, frustrate or complicate his efforts to eliminate
subordinate crime or an unacceptable risk of crime.
Military necessity:41 Without success, defendants argued that a com-
mander preoccupied with planning offensive tactics,42 or with counter-
ing an enemy assault,43 has no time or energy remaining to control his
subordinates. Also unsuccessful was the claim that military survival
requires tactics or procedures involving a high risk of subordinate
crime.44 Arguably, therefore, the laws of war require officers to retreat
or surrender rather than pursue victory at a high risk of subordinate
crime.45
B. Defects in American Law
American courts require a congressional grant of jurisdiction to try
violations of the laws of war.40 In making this grant-to general military
40. Compare High Command Trial, 11 TWC at 511-12 (defendant von Lecb) with
the Tokyo Tribunal's demand that cabinet members (but not lower administrative of-
ficers or military commanders) resign if unable successfully to order the elimination of
war crimes against POW's. ToKYo JUDGmENr, supra note 10, at 28-32, excerpted at 15
UNLR 72-74. On the limited exculpatory impact of delayed resignation, see Trial of
Ohlendorf, 4 TWC 518-20 (defendant Schulz).
41. None of the Tribunals used the term "military necessity" in discussing command
responsibility, but the notion lurks in the background of any war crimes case. See gen-
erally 15 UNLR 175, and O'Brien, Military Necessity in International Law, 1 Woru.a
POLm" 138 (1957).
42. See, e.g., Trial of Rauer, 4 UNLR 113.
43. See, e.g., the argument of Yamashita's counsel before the ,Military Commission, 4
UNLR at 24-25. Dissenting in Yamashita, Mr. Justice Murphy argued that, under pres-
sure of enemy assault, a commander should be held responsible only for specific crimes
of which he had actual advance knowledge and which he had the power to prevent.
327 U.S. at 35, 37. While the majority presumably disagreed, it nowhere stated that
severe military difficulties might not have some influence on the duty to intervene
against risks of future crime, or against known specific crimes and criminal policies.
44. In the Trial of Masao, 11 UNLR 56, a commander was held responsible for sub-
ordinate crimes committed on an evacuation march of POW's, the alternative to which
was surrendering the prisoners to advancing allied forces. Yamashita issued bare or-
ders to suppress guerilla activity, raising a high risk subordinates would abuse the or-
ders, 4 UNLR at 31, because an American invasion and a general breakdown of com-
munications made elaboration of the order impossible, 4 UNLR at 18-23. Presumably,
not to have issued any order would have amounted to accepting serious military set-
backs at the hands of the guerillas. The Judgment did not discuss the issue.
45. Lower-level officers, of course, may often be under superior orders not to re-
treat or surrender. The scope of "lack of legal authority" as an excuse in this situation
remains an open question.
46. Crimes cognizable by federal courts must be enacted by Congress, rather than
developed through a common law evolution. United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11
U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812). Arguably, however, the President himself, as Commander-in-
Chief of the Armed Forces and as the nation's representative in foreign affairs, has
constitutional authority to establish tribunals to try foreign nationals accused of in-
ternational crimes against the United States or its citizens. Cf. Hiraba)ashi v. United
States, 320 U.S. 81, 92 (1943) and Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28.29 (1942), where the
Court artfully avoids the issue. On the enforcement of international law in United
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courts-martial and, concurrently, to military commissions47-Congress
had an opportunity to define in detail the offense of command respon-
sibility (and, of course, other war crimes) and to provide for vigorous
enforcement. Congress missed the opportunity and instead introduced
new complications into the law of command responsibility.
Wholesale "incorporation": Though an exercise of Congress' power
"to define and punish ... Offenses against the Law of Nations,"4 the
grant of war crimes jurisdiction neither defines offenses nor specifies
their punishment. Instead, Article 18 of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice (UCMJ) states merely that "General courts-martial . . . have
jurisdiction to try any person who by the law of war is subject to trial
by a military tribunal and may adjudge any punishment permitted by
the law of war." 49 Congress has simply "incorporated" the laws of war
into the system of military justice.50 On command responsibility at
least, this body of law is too inexact and inconsistent to influence mili-
tary conduct. Consequently, wholesale incorporation raises problems of
unconstitutional vagueness.9 ' Precision is an especially important vir-
tue where legal duties transcend common notions of moral obligation
States courts, see generally Dickenson, The Law of Nations as Part of the National
Law of the U.S., 101 U. PA. L. Rav. 26 (1952); Sprout, Theories as to the Application of
International Law in the Federal Courts of the United States, 26 Am. J. INT'eL LAW
280 (1932).
47. Article 18, U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 818 (1970).
48. U.S. CONsr., art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
49. Article 18, U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 818 (1970).
50. See Ex parte Quirn, 317 U.S. 1, 30 (1942).
51. A federal court has no jurisdiction to try crimes unless Congress has defined
the offense with particularity. United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch)
32 (1812). Even when created by legislation, an offense is unconstitutionally vague If It
fails to afford adequate guidance to law officers and fair warning to potential violators.
See, e.g., Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972); Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405
U.S. 156 (1972); Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971).
The Supreme Court has upheld wholesale incorporation of the laws of war a~alnst
a claim that common law offenses were thereby recognized without adequate definition,
Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942), but the continued vitality of the decision is open to
doubt. The vagueness doctrine has developed considerably since Quirin. Further, the
laws of war have themselves grown much more complex and confused since the deci-
sion, aggravating the v~gueness problem. See generally Kunz, The Chaotic Status of
the Laws of War, 45 Am. J. INT'L LAw 37 (1951). Concerning confusion in international
notions of relational responsibility, see Wasserstrom, The Relevance of Nuremberg, I
PHIL. AND PUBLic AFFAIRS 22 (1971). Quirin relied heavily on United States v. Smith,
18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153 (1820), cited in Quirin, supra, at 29. While holding that a statute
outlawing "piracy" was a sufficiently detailed exercise of congressional power to "de-
fine and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences
against the law of Nations," citing U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 10, Smith stressed that
"the crime of piracy is defined by the law of nations with reasonable certainty," and
suggested that wholesale incorporation of "Offences against the Law of Nations' would
raise constitutional questions. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 157-60. It can hardly be said that
command responsibility, much less war crimes law generally, finds a reasonably certain
definition in the "law of nations." Cf. also Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65, 82
(1857), which upheld congressional incorporation into the navy code of all crimes
"punished according to the laws and customs of the sea" on the theory-patently in-
applicable to modem war crimes-that "what the crimes are, and how they are to be
punished, is well known by practical men in the navy and army,"
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and conflict with pressures for success in combat. "Incorporation" vests
in the trial forum nearly unlimited discretion to define the offense,52
a discretion typically exercised in an atmosphere of high emotion. Be-
cause, war crimes cases, like the wars which generate them, occur irregu-
larly, judge-made common law has little chance to develop consistency
and coherence.
Conflict with UGMJ offenses: Despite Article 18's incorporation of
international law, American war crimes are customarily tried as viola-
tions of specific criminal provisions in the UCMJ.53 Apparently, the
prosecution has unfettered discretion to proceed either under these
provisions or under Article 18's international law."
While the UCMJ's articles do not expressly mention command re-
sponsibility, the offense might conceivably be charged as a form of
complicity in the subordinate's crime, as an inferior grade of homicide,
or as the inchoate offense of "dereliction of duty."z' Only complicity
52. The Supreme Court's role would be the minor one of determining that the
trial forum, in setting standards for the offense, did not go beyond the international
law of war as recognized by the United States. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1. 13, 16-18.
The Supreme Court is apparently reluctant to formulate international criminal law
on its own, preferring to exercise a mere veto power over interpretations developed by
lower military courts. Id. at 17-18.
53. DEP'T OF THE U.S. AR.ny, FIELD IANUAL, supra note 9, pam. 507(b).
54. The fact that the UCMJ makes a delict punishable under one of its express
articles apparently does not deprive a military tribunal of jurisdiction to try the delict
instead as a violation of some body of non-Code law, advanced by the prosecution.
which the tribunal has jurisdiction to enforce. Cf. Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341
(1951), and United States v. Gallagher, 21 C.M.R. 435 (956). In drafting "charges"
(i.e., an information), the prosecution will normally but need not specify which Code
provision is purported to cover the defendant's delict. MANUAL FOP COtrrS MARTIAL,
[cited hereinafter as MCM], para. 27, at 6.3 (1969). See United States v. Shulz, I U.S.C.M..
512, 4 C.M.R. 104 (1952). But, if the prosecution charges only under specific UCMJ
criminal provisions, rather than under Article 18's "incorporated' international law, and
if the prosecution throughout trial and appeal directs its evidence and argument only
to those provisions, it would be, at the very least, extraordinary for the courts to con-
vict the defendant of an offense against international law.
That international and specific Code offenses might be in conflict has received little
consideration. In Ex parte Quirin, the Supreme Court seemed to assume, without so
stating, that the "Law of War" jurisdiction of military courts is intended solely for
trial of enemy belligerents, the specific provisions of domestic military law being suf-
ficient to cover all delicts by American military personnel. 317 U.S. 1, 28.29, 47. Cf. In
re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 7, 9. In originally recommending that courts-martial and
military commissions have concurrent jurisdiction over violations of the "Law of War."
Judge Advocate General of the Army Crowder suggested that such jurisdiction was
needed over American military personnel only to try delicts entirely unrecognized b)
specific provisions of United States military law. S. Rep. No. 229, 63rd Cong., 2d Ss.
53, 98-99 (1914). Theories of command responsibility, however, exist both in interna-
tional law and in specific UCMJ provisions. While this is also, of course, the case with
more conventional "war crimes," such as rape and murder, the overlap there is of no
practical significance, the international and military versions of tie offenses being
virtually identical.
55. Complicity through inaction is discussed in MCM, para. 156, at 28-4. which con-
strues the definition of "principals" to crime given in Art. 77, U.C.M.J.. 10 U.S.C.
§ 877 (1970). Involuntary manslaughter is discussed in MCM, pam. 198b. at 28-46, con-
struing the definition of the offense given in Art. 119(b)(1), U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. 919(b)(1)
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would, like Article 18, involve the possibility of capital punishment or
life imprisonment. Inferior grades of homicide and "dereliction" carry
much lower maximum penalties.50
Complicity-through-omission requires that the defendant have had
a "duty to interfere" with the crime.57 While the command relation-
ship does apparently raise this duty,58 the alleged accomplice must have
been at the scene of the crime, must have approved of the crime's per-
petration, and must have, through this approval, provided "encourage-
ment" for the perpetration.59 As for involuntary manslaughter, the
Manual for Courts-Martial's broad definition might be read as requir-
ing a commander to eliminate a high risk that his subordinates will
commit murder, but the Manual's illustrative examples of the offense
do not even hint at such an interpretation. 0 An officer has been con-
victed of negligent homicide for failing to stop a subordinate's crime,
but the Board of Review, in reversing, indicated that an officer must
have actual knowledge of the subordinate's crime before incurring a
duty to intervene against it.01 Assimilating command responsibility to
traditional notions of homicide is obviously a troublesome project. Offi-
cers have quite frequently been convicted of "dereliction of duty" con-
cerning subordinate crimes. While typically the officer was present dur-
ing the crimes and "did nothing," breach of general supervisory duties
(1970). Negligent homicide is discussed in MCM, para. 213f(12), at 28-80, tile offense
being contained in the General Article, Art. 134, U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. 934 (1970). Dere-
liction of duty is discussed in MCM, para. 171c, at 28-22, construing the offense created
by Art. 92(3), U.C.M.J., 10 US.C. § 892(3) (1970).
56. Complicity through inaction would render the commander a "principal .
subject to the maximum punishment authorized for the commission of the [underlying)
offense," which will often be capital. MCM, Table of Maximum Punishments, para.
127c, at 25-10 n.l. Article 18 of the U.C.M.J. allows that war crimes may be met with
"any punishment permitted by the law of war." 10 U.S.C. § 818 (1970). The role of
capital punishment in United States courts is, of course, confused in tie wake of
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). The maximum penalties for involuntary man-
slaughter, negligent homicide, and dereliction of duty are 3 years, 1 year, and 3 months
respectively. MCM, Table of Maximum Punishments, para. 127c, at 25-10 through 25.17.
57. MCM, para. 156, at 28-4.
58. See United States v. Rexroad, 34 C.M.R. 783, 786 (1963) and United States v.
Waluski, 21 C.M.R. 46, 55 (U.S.C.M.A., 1956) (concurring opinion of Latimer, J.).
59. MCM, para. 156, at 28-4.
60. Involuntary manslaughter . . . is an unlawful killing by culpable negligence
.... Culpable negligence is a degree of carelessness greater than simple negligence
.*Thus the basis of a charge of involuntary manslaughter may be a negligent act
or omission which, when viewed in the light of human experience, might foresee-
ably result in the death of another, even though death would not, necessarily, be a
natural and probable consequence of the act or omission.
MCM, para. 198b, at 28-46. But the Manual lists as examples:
conducting tarket practice so that the bullets go in the direction of an inhabited
house within range; pointing a pistol in fun at another and pulling the trigger
' and carelessly leaving poisons or dangerous drugs where they may endanger life."
Id.
61. United States v. Flaherty, 12 C.M.R. 466, 469 (1953).
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has occasionally been punished where subordinate crimes followed,02
and the Code criminalizes dereliction of any duty created by "custom
of the service," an obviously elastic concept.03
In short, rather than resolving the conflicts in international law, the
UCMJ supplements them with additional theories of command re-
sponsibility, also poorly formulated, and fails to indicate which pro-
visions apply in which circumstances.
Misplaced prosecutorial authority: Normally, it is the commanding
officer who decides when to convene courts-martial for prosecution of
his subordinates. 64 This procedure is manifestly unsuitable for enforc-
ing rules of command responsibility. A commander will naturally hesi-
tate to prosecute a subordinate officer for command responsibility, be-
cause such action would invite attention to his own behavior regarding
the underlying subordinate crimes.05 By delegating prosecutorial dis-
cretion to military men without legal training, the system promotes
inconsistent enforcement of any offense as vaguely formulated and
technical as command responsibility. And the system provides no
agency or individual-except the President himself-to investigate and
prosecute cabinet members, civilian administrators, and military offi-
cers at the apex of the command hierarchy.00
62. See generally Avins, Military Leadership and the Law, 47 CAuF. L. REV. 828,
861-68 (1959).
63. MCM, para. 171c, at 28-22. The Army has suggested that command responsibility
is "'as a minimum" punishable as a dereliction of duty. U.S. DEar. OF Tim Anst, Army
SuBJEcr ScREn.DuL, No. 27-1, at 10 (1970).
64. Art. 22, U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 822 (1970). The President and the pertinent serice
secretary also have convening authority. Arts. 22(a)(1) and (2), U.C..M.J., 10 U.S.C. §
822(a)(1) and (2) (1970). No convening authority resides in a commanding officer if he
is the "accuser" of the defendant, Art. 22(b), U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 822(b) (1970).
65. With prosecution authority lodged in the command structure, the offense of
command responsibility will probably be met more frequently with informal adminis-
trative sanctions than with formal charges. The division commander of the units in-
volved in the My Lai incident, Maj. General Samuel IV. Koster, was demoted and
censured for failing to ascertain "the accuracy of the information which he had about
My Lai." Washington Post, May 20, 1971, § A, at 1, cols. 3-4. at 12. col. 2. No criminal
charges were preferred against officers, with the exception of Captain Medina, for failing
to prevent or stop the massacre. Fourteen other officers were charged with covering-up
or failing to investigate the incident, but only one-Colonel Omn Henderson-was
brought to trial, and he was acquitted. Telford Taylor. United States Prosecutor at the
Nuremberg Subsequent Proceedings, aptly concluded from this record that "the Arn)'s
procedures for the prevention, detection, and punishment of war crimes hale failed
abysmally." Taylor, The Course of Military Justice, N.Y. Times, Feb. 2. 1972,. at 39. cols.
3-7. There is a large literature discussing "command influence" over prosecutorial deci-
sions. See, e.g., note 84 infra.
66. Indeed, by conferring war crimes jurisdiction only upon military courts, whose
jurisdiction over civilians is subject to very restrictive constitutional limits. Congress
may have given non-military "commanders"-e.g. cabinet members and Defense De-
partment and CIA officials--effective immunity from war crimes prosecution. See gen-
erally Toomepuu, Trial of American Civilians as War Criminals in American Courts,
31 FED. B.J. 73 (1972); Shaneyfelt, War Crimes and the Jurisdictional MAaze, 4 INT'L I AWin
924 (1970).
1291
The Yale Law Journal
II. Proposed Rules for Prospective Application in American Courts
A. The General Case for "Strong" Rules of Command
Responsibility, and an Exception
1. "Strong" Rules for American Commanders
"Strong" rules of command responsibility have a mental standard of
constructive (rather than actual) knowledge, recognize risks of future
crime (rather than only specific crimes or criminal policies) as a men-
tal object, and impose rigorous intervention duties subject to only
narrowly defined excusing conditions. Their main advantage is straight-
forward: If rules influence command behavior, and subordinates obey
their commanders, strong rules are more likely to reduce the incidence
of subordinate crime. That subordinates typically obey is a basic tenet
of military life. That officers will be influenced by consistently en-
forced rules on command responsibility is also plausible. While the
proposed rules are somewhat complicated, officers as a class are reason-
ably well-educated, are normally expected to consult and execute de-
tailed directives, and are typically anxious to maintain an unblemished
career record by following all important rules. Further, while some of
the duties created by the proposed rules may exceed intuitive moral
obligations, they would never require defiance, but always a tighten-
ing, of normal hierarchical discipline. 67
Adoption of strong rules would also improve the general reputation
of the laws of war. Popular reaction to the Calley conviction revealed
that war crimes law is distrusted in part because it strikes most harshly
at low-level personnel, leaving virtually untouched the high-level offi-
cials who mold an army's attitudes and abilities, decide its tasks, and
benefit most palpably from its successes." Strong rules on command
responsibility, by distributing sanctions more equitably over the mili-
tary hierarchy, might prevent popular feeling from rendering war
67. If, at the risk of severest immediate discipline, privates are required to disre-
gard the illegal orders of their commanders, a commander should surely be requlred
to exert substantial efforts to frustrate illegal acts by his subordinates. Note that mililtary
law already goes to extraordinary lengths in imposing affirmative duties on mere sol.
diers to maintain order. All persons subject to the UCMJ, regardless of their rank, must
do their "utmost" to prevent and suppress mutinies. MCM, para. 173(c), at 28-23.
68. Lt. William Calley was convicted on March 30, 1971, of murdering dozens of
civilians in the My Lai Massacre. Reaction to the case was immediate and vociferous,
much of it to the effect that Calley had been made a "scapegoat" for higher-ups. See,
e.g., N.Y. Times, Mar. 30, 1971, at 12, cols. 1-2; id. Mar. 31, 1971, at 1, col. 2, at 18, cols.
4-5; id. Apr. 3, 1971, at 14, col. 3.
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crimes law a dead letter, or from supplementing it with political witch-
hunts against officials escaping regular legal processes.00
If provided with a strong and workable theory of vertical complicity,
the laws of war could also safely jettison some of the dangerously broad
notions of horizontal complicity developed in the post-war tribunals.--
Though differing in details, these notions share a common conse-
quence: Whenever the normal functions of a military or civilian
bureaucracy facilitate the perpetration of war crimes, a duty to mutiny,
or at least to protest actively, is imposed on any member of the bureauc-
racy aware of the crimes, regardless of his hierarchical relationship to
the perpetrators.7' As this duty rarely will be honored, it serves only
69. For example, Marcus Raskin has suggested that "militarists" and "imperialists" be
purged from the American military and political bureaucracies through pscudo.judicial
procedures based on the de-nazification programs which the United States operated in
post-war Germany. Raskin, From Imperial 11'ar-Making to a Code of Personal Respon-
sibility, in R. STAviNS, R. BARNET, AND M. RASKL', VASHINGTON, PLA.S A% ACCntEsivE
WAR 255-374 (1971).
70. Horizontal complicity was broadly construed on three theories. First, the charters
establishing various of the war crimes tribunals recognized "conspirac)" or participa-
tion in a "common plan" as a basis for liability. See, e.g., Nuremberg Charter, Art.
6(a), discussed in U.N. HISTORY, supra note 10, at 196, and Regulation 8(ii), British
Royal Warrant of June 14, 1945, quoted in 1 UNLR 108. On the use of these theories
in the Nuremberg trials, see Wasserstrom, supra note 51. On their use in the Tok)o
Trial, see J. KEENAN AND E. BROWN, CRIMES AGAINST INTERN"ATIONAL LAw 88-112 (1950).
Second, tribunal charters occasionally "outlawed" whole organizations, such as the Nazi
SS, and made participation in them a crime. See, e.g., Nuremberg Charter, Arts. 9, 10,
& 11, discussed in UN HISTORY, supra, at 298-99. See generally Jackson, The Law Under
Which Nazi Organizations are Accused of Being Criminal, 19 TF-.is. L.Q. 371 (1946);
Wasserstrom, supra. Finally, the charters typicall) based simple complicity in criminal
policies executed by an otherwise legal organization or by its leaders on a defendant's
mere knowledge of the policies coupled with his normal participation in the organiza-
tion. For example, Art. 11(2) of Control Council Law No. 10, the "charter" for the
Nuremberg Subsequent Proceedings, quoted at 10 TWC xix, imposed liabilityl on any-
one who "took a consenting part" or "was connected with plans or enterprises inolving"
or was a "member of any group or organization connected with the commission of"
a war crime. See also the U.N. Commission's discussion of The Justice Trial, 6 UNLR
84-88.
Tribunals of course varied in their application of all these theories, but the logic of
the theories allows rather startling conclusions. For instance, Wasserstrom, supra, reads
the Nuremberg Charter to suggest that draftees into the United States armed forces,
even if remaining safely at a base in the United States, might be "chargeable with all
the crimes committed by the armed forces in Vietnam." Id. at 4546.
71. This result follows logically if responsibility for crimes committed by the bureauc-
racy's leaders, or by others utilizing its resources, is imposed upon any cnmember of the
bureaucracy who is aware of the crimes and who continued to "serve" the bureaucracy
in a normal manner. Responsibility can be avoided under such a theory only by breaking
or resisting bureaucratic routine, or by resigning; these alternatives all amount to
"mutiny" when; as is often the case in war-time, resignation and resistance arc illegal.
In civilian criminal law, by contrast, the mens rea for complicity is usually "intent"
or "purpose" to aid the perpetration, not merely "knowledge" of it. See, e.g., A.LI. MODE.L
PENAL CODE (Proposed Official Draft) § 2.06(3)(a) (1962). Of course intent is usually
inferable from the accused's knowledge of the perpetration coupled with his conduct
facilitating the perpetration, but only because facilitation in a normal civilian setting
requires stepping rather dramatically outside the everyday routine of legal enterprise.
War crimes, however, are rarely separated neatly from the "legal" activities of the
military or governmental bureaucracies in, through, or by means of which the crimes
are committed. For instance, a janitor or clerk in the business office of a concentration
camp does facilitate to some degree the crimes committed in the camp. In such cases,
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to lend an aura of fantasy to war crimes law and to give prosecutors
nearly limitless discretion in selecting defendants. 72
Against strong rules, three general arguments are conceivable. First,
such rules might be claimed to inhibit the combat aggressiveness and
effectiveness of officers. But the laws of war presume that a nation can
adequately prosecute its campaigns without committing crimes. If this
presumption is unsound, the proper response is a general weakening of
war crimes law, not a selective cushioning of its impact on officers.
Second, a strong rule might be claimed to deter "good men" from
accepting military commissions and promotions. The short answer is
that "good men" have, among other virtuous ambitions and abilities,
the desire and capacity to maintain an army which is free of war crimes.
Finally, it might be claimed that rules involving constructive knowl-
edge and requiring the elimination of criminal risks must be so vague
and broad as to encourage adjudication by caprice, hindsight, and preju-
dice. This objection is plausible, if only because some past cases involv-
ing strong rules have arguably been open to it.3 It can be answered,
however, only by drafting strong rules which are comprehensible and
capable of fair application.
2. Exception: A Weak Rule for Enemy Commanders
For several reasons, however, an enemy commander should be tried
in American courts only under a weak rule of command responsibility.
First, strong rules have heretofore been used only in American initiated
and dominated tribunals. 74 There is room for doubt that "interna-
"intent" to aid in the crime-in the sense of a desire or purpose to do so-cannot be
fairly inferred from the accused's knowledge of the crime coupled with his actual
facilitation of it. To establish intent, the prosecution would probably have to show
that the accused went qut of his way, or beyond "normal" routines, to facilitate tile
crime. It must be conceded that some war crimes tribunals, while jettisoning tile tra-
ditional "intent" standard, did require some "special" factors for conviction. There
was, for instance, a tendency to convict only the policy-makers and executives of the
organizations involved in war crimes. See, e.g., The Belsen Trial, 2 UNLR 1, 119.20,
and The Zyklon B Case, 1 UNLR 93, 120-22. Cf. also Trial of Pohl, 5 TWC 195, 1170.
But no "narrow" theory of complicity was ever developed in a formal and satisfactory
manner.
72. Such broad discretion might, of course, be thought useful in trials aimed pri-
marily at convincing a conquered people of the errors of their leaders' ways. See, e.g.,
Trial of Pohl, 5 TWC 195, 1159. But theories of complicity must be much more pre-
cisely defined to afford adequate guidance for genuinely "judicial" tribunals and fair
warning to potential law breakers.
73. For criticism of some of the major command responsibility decisions of tile
post-war tribunals, see R. MhNEnAR, supra note 12, at 71-72; A. REEL, supra note 4; A.
voN KNIERIEM, THE NUREMBERG TRIALS, 196-99 (1959); and In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1,
26 (1945) (dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Murphy).
74. Yamashita was tried by an American military commission. The Tokyo Tribunal,
while having judges from several nations, was thoroughly dominated by the American
occupation authority in Japan, nnder General Douglas A. MacArthur. See R. MINEAR,
supra note 12, at 160-72.
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tional law" fully recognizes strong rules, and American tribunals should
not exceed that law in dealing with foreign defendants.
Second, pressure for revenge will in practice render any rule harsh
and inflexible when applied to enemy military leaders, and provisions
on constructive knowledge and elimination of risks invite special
abuse in this context. When the defendant is American, by contrast,
the extra-legal pressures will be toward leniency: Legal duties will be
threatened not with an arbitrary expansion, but an arbitrary shrinkage.
Third, to determine fairly whether a commander has breached duties
to investigate suspicious facts, to eliminate undue risks of future crime,
or to intervene with "sufficient" vigor against specific crimes, criminal
policies, or risks, a tribunal requires detailed information about the
combat environment and the military hierarchy in which the defendant
operated. Because enemy commanders will rarely be tried-because
rarely captured-before the conclusion of hostilities, evidence will be
stale or unavailable, and defendants will typically be joined into mass
trials, where such information will necessarily receive imperfect atten-
tion. When trying American defendants, however, tribunals can avoid
laundry list indictments and delayed justice by remaining in constant
operation throughout a war. Testimony and evidence will be readily
available, and rules can be given wide publicity to avoid unfair surprise.
Fourth, while strong rules can reform a nation's own military and
administrative practices, they may increase the incidence of war crimes
committed by an enemy. If faced with defeat, an enemy commander
may resist more tenaciously-to the point of tolerating further subordi-
nate crimes-when strong rules await him upon surrender or capture.
For all these reasons, only the first of the four rules proposed below
should apply to enemy commanders, while American commanders
should be subject to all of the rules. The first rule is a "weak" one,
and each of the others strengthens it in a particular respect.
B. The Rules
1. Rule One: Duty to Act Against Known Crimes
or Policies of Crime
If a commanding officer was actually aware that a particular war
crime was being committed or planned by a subordinate, or that a
unit of his subordinates was engaged in a policy of committing war
crimes, and if he made no attempt to prevent, arrest, or otherwise
interfere with the commission of crime, or immediately to protest its
commission to his superiors, he is an accomplice in said crime(s).
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Discussion: This rule requires only that a commander not stand
mutely by as subordinates commit or plan crimes, or pursue criminal
policies, of which he has actual knowledge. Because a tribunal trying a
foreign commander is assumed to have only a sketchy appreciation of
the circumstances under which he operated, the rule does not require
a determination of whether the defendant's efforts were "reasonable" or
"appropriate": Any good faith gesture against the crimes or policies,
including a verbal protest to his superiors, will negate liability.
Neither this rule nor any of the others attempts to define commander
status. For American defendants, Congress and the Executive can in-
sure that the legal definition of commander status is consistent with the
actual chain of cominand. For foreign commanders, no brief formula
will be fully adequate. The tribunal should take care to honor the
working realities of the enemy command structure. If a commander's
conceded subordinates commit crimes at the specific order of his hier-
archical superior, or commit crimes which he cannot suppress without
violating superior orders, Rule One does require the commander at
least to protest these crimes, or his inability to suppress them, to his
superiors. No other result is fairly consistent with the similar inter-
national duty on ordinary soldiers to disobey illegal orders. But when
the perpetrators are actually commanded in their illegal activities by
an official belonging to another department or hierarchy, command
responsibility should run to that official and not to the accused com-
mander. While the law of war must occasionally require disobedience
of national law and of superior orders, it is another matter to ascribe
commander status to particular bureaucratic positions, e.g., cabinet
"minister," not enjoying command authority in national law or prac-
tice over the subordinates in question. Given the myriad bureaucratic
titles and organizational structures a nation might adopt, this would
be an enormous project, and it seems at any rate both unfair and in-
efficient to use a criminal sanction on individuals, rather than such
devices as multilateral treaties, to induce nations to conform their mili-
tary, police, intelligence, and political structures to some international
ideal.
2. Rule Two: Duty to Prevent or Arrest Known Crimes or Policies
(1) If a commanding officer was actually aware that a particular war
crime was being committed or planned by a subordinate, or that a unit
of subordinates was engaged in a policy of committing war crimes, and
if he failed to prevent or arrest, as the case may be, the commission
of crime, he is guilty of a war crime, provided that he is not guilty if
1296
Vol. 82: 1274, 1973
Command Responsibility for War Crimes
(A)(i) he reasonably believed himself physically unable to arrest or pre-
vent completely the commission of crime, or (ii) he reasonably believed
that he could not completely arrest or prevent the commission of crime
without immediately risking death or serious injury to himself or his
subordinates, or (iii) he reasonably believed he could not completely
arrest or prevent the commission of crime without breaching superior
orders or regulations, and if (B) he exerted all efforts consonant with
his physical and legal powers, and with the safety of himself and his
subordinates, to arrest or prevent the commission of crime, and if (C) he
notified his superior officer without delay that his efforts might prove
inadequate.
(2) No officer shall be prosecuted, punished, or disciplined for vio-
lating superior orders, for surrendering his unit or ordering its retreat,
or for endangering the life or safety of his subordinates if he believed
these actions necessary to prevent or arrest the commission of war
crimes by his subordinates.
Discussion: The mental elements are identical to those in Rule One.
The intervention duty is much stronger but similarly avoids elastic
normative terms such as "reasonable" or "appropriate." Rule Two
requires successful prevention or suppression of subordinate crime un-
less one of the excusing conditions, §§ (1)(A)(i) through (1)(A)(iii), is
met. Even when excuses apply, a commander must exert all efforts
within the constraints of the excuse, i.e., not just "reasonable" efforts,
§ (1)(B), and must also immediately notify his superior of the possibility
of failure, § (1)(C). (Notification of course raises Rule Two duties in
the superior officer.) A duty to resign is avoided: Impractical in com-
bat circumstances, such a duty might also encourage officers to "walk
away" from on-going subordinate crimes or policies.
The excusing clauses, §§ (1)(A)(i) through (1)(A)(iii), are phrased
subjectively, i.e., in terms of the commander's reasonable beliefs.
Whether the excusing conditions are objectively present may be un-
clear to a commander in some circumstances, and it seems unnecessarily
harsh to require officers to guess correctly. Invocation of excusing con-
ditions upon reasonable belief does not of course imply that the com-
mander's intervention duty is limited to merely "reasonable" action. "
A commander may invoke a present inability to control his men,
75. The excusing clauses might be based on the accused's actual, as opposed to
reasonable, belief, but then commanders might hesitate to challenge superior orders,
and physical and combat obstacles, impeding their intervention against crime, aware
that prosecutors could not easily prove the accused had not in fact believed that ec-
cusing conditions were present in such circumstances.
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§ (1)(A)(i), even if it stems from earlier defaults, such as his failure to
train them properly. (Such prior delicts may, however, violate Rule
Four, where a mental object of risks of future crime is recognized.)
Excuse (1)(A)(ii) avoids the concept of "military necessity," which finds
no clear stopping point if expanded beyond conventional notions of
self-defense. The clause encompasses only danger to life and limb, not
the peril of retreat or surrender. While tribunals may balk at punish-
ing their own citizens for failing to meet a duty to retreat or surrender,
without this duty command responsibility would evaporate whenever
a unit encountered difficulties. Section (1)(A)(iii) provides a narrow ex-
cuse of superior orders. While an officer must of course disobey illegal
superior orders, he should not be required to disobey legal orders--
e.g., schedules of attack-which in the circumstances hinder his sup-
pression of subordinate crime.70 His superior is typically better placed
to evaluate the consequences of, and alternatives to, altering such
orders, and the notification procedure ensures that the superior will
quickly be put to this choice.
Section (2) of the Rule permits an officer to ignore excusing condi-
tions and give absolute priority to crime suppression. Otherwise, offi-
cers and tribunals might interpret the excusing conditions too broadly,
for an officer not availing himself of them would risk prosecution tin-
der conventional military law. Section (2) is phrased in terms of actual,
not "reasonable," belief so as to maximize its protection of command-
ers who act boldly to prevent or arrest subordinate crimes.
3. Rule Three: Duties to Know of Specific Crimes and Policies
If a commanding officer is aware of particular facts indicating that
his subordinates are committing or planning to commit war crimes,
or that a subordinate unit is engaged in a policy of committing war
crimes, and if he fails to draw reasonable inferences from those facts,
or to make a diligent and thorough investigation of them, he shall be
guilty of a war crime if such inferences or investigation would have
revealed to him the commission of subordinate crimes or the existence
of a subordinate criminal policy.
76. If the mental elements of Rule Two are met, a commander does, however, have
a duty to countermand or frustrate execution of illegal superior orders which by.pass
him and issue directly to his subordinates. Because such countermanding would not
violate any superior order binding on the commander himself, the excuse in § (1)(A)(III)
would be unavailable. His subordinates are tinder a duty to disobey the illegal
order and are fairly entitled to the intervention and support of the "by-passed" com-
mander. Of course, any attempt to intervene would probably draw from the superior
a new order to cease and desist. This new order, binding the commander personally,
would fall within the terms of § (1)(A)(iii), and the commander would need only
to protest it, for it would not itself be illegal, e.g., an order to do an illegal act. But
the commander could disobey it with impunity, because of § (2).
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Discussion: Rule Three merely applies a proper interpretation of
constructive knowledge to the mental objects used in Rules One and
Two. Absent duties to know, the existence of Rule Two's stiff inter-
vention duties might discourage commanders from looking into sus-
picious circumstances and rumors concerning their subordinates' be-
havior. While Rule Two's intervention duties avoid general norma-
tive terms, Rule Three uses the terms "reasonable" and "diligent and
thorough" because it is impossible to enumerate or classify the many
circumstances and considerations which determine what inferences or
investigations are justified by any "particular fact." The use of general
normative terms here does not threaten serious inconsistencies in case-
by-case adjudication, for questions of proper inference and investiga-
tion are less plagued by sharp value conflicts than is the question of
how vigorously a commander "should intervene" against crime. Breach
of these duties to know is actionable even if the officer-had he known
of the pertinent mental object-could have invoked one of Rule Two's
excusing clauses. This result is fair because none of the excuses entirely
extinguishes a commander's intervention duties.
4. Rule Four: Duty to Eliminate Non-Negligible
Risks of Future Crime
If a commanding officer's subordinate commits a war crime while
under his command, and if-prior to commission of the crime-it was
unreasonable for the commanding officer to believe, on the basis of
facts and circumstances of which he was aware, that there was only a
negligible likelihood that such a war crime would be committed, the
commanding officer shall also be guilty of a war crime, provided that
he shall not be guilty if, before commission of the crime, he notified
his superior officer that he believed a more-than-negligible likelihood
existed that such a war crime would be committed and that he be-
lieved himself incapable of reducing the likelihood to a negligible
level, and provided further that a commanding officer not so notified
shall not be guilty under this Rule for crimes committed by other than
his immediate subordinates.
Discussion: This rule attempts to meet four major problems raised
by any duty to eliminate risks of future crime.
Definition of Unacceptable Risk. No matter how well managed, an
army can never eliminate entirely the possibility that a war crime
might occur. Rule Four thus speaks not of a zero, but of a "negligible"
likelihood of future crime. The notion is not subject to precise defi-
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nition. The tribunal should assess, in essence, whether the type of war
crime involved in the case could have been prevented by the command
structure generally through better recruiting policies, better training,
better leadership and discipline, or more prudent choice of strategy,
tactics, or weapons. If it could, the risk of its commission was more-
than-negligible. An army must select from available strategies, tactics,
weapons, and procedures those which-whatever their relative costs and
benefits in other respects-are least likely to induce or facilitate subordi-
nate war crimes. This injunction is admittedly radical: It may mean that
a nation cannot prosecute certain kinds of wars at a tolerable cost.77
But alternative definitions of "unacceptable" risks are unpersuasive.
The post-war tribunals tried to distinguish acceptable from unaccept-
able risks by identifying the particular source or cause of the risk, i.e.,
by listing kinds of risk which are inherently or invariably excessive. 8
This is an unpromising approach. A listing would need constant re-
vision to keep up with changes in military tactics and weapons. Fur-
ther, it is not clear that risks come in "kinds." Subordinate crime is
typically risked by the coincidence of myriad discrete circumstances
and factors, each of which might be of no concern were the others
absent.
A rule might of course require intervention against only "unreason-
able" or "gross" risks of crime, but such vague terms would allow each
tribunal to weigh conflicting values differently, and officers would thus
receive inadequate guidance from the law. Rule Four recognizes that a
commander may reasonably believe risks to be negligible when in fact
they are not, and indeed allows him to escape liability through a noti-
fication procedure even when he is aware risks are too high. Construing
high risks of crime to be "acceptable" is neither necessary nor sufficient
to ensure fairness to defendants.
Perception of Risk. The Rule implies a duty to intervene when the
commander cannot reasonably believe risks are negligible, and inter-
vention is adequate only if, in light of it, he can reasonably believe
risks have been reduced to negligibility. Rule Four discourages com-
77. For example, it is conceivable that the United States could not have fought the
Vietnam War at only a "negligible" risk of war crimes unless it had recruited its troops
much more selectively, had abandoned use of heavy firepower, free-fire zones, and search.
and-destroy missions, and had employed extremely expensive training programs. If so,
regular enforcement of Rule Four, and regular use of its notification provision, would
have placed liability in the President, or, at least, in the highest military commanders.
That this probably would not have halted the war or brought a change in its methods,
but rather only have led to repeal or disregard of the Rule, does not count against
the Rule's adoption. It is better that law confront obviously reckless practice and stiffer
defeat than remain silent and imply that all is well.
78. See pp. 1282-84 supra.
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manders from isolating themselves generally from their subordinates:
In judging the reasonableness of a commander's belief, tie tribunal is
to consider his actual state of knowledge, but his belief may be un-
reasonable even if no particular facts and circumstances known to him
indicate the likelihood of criminal activity. Indeed the greater a com-
mander's uncertainty and ignorance, the less reasonable would be his
belief that risks of crime are below the benchmark of negligibility. 0
The concept of "reasonable belief" tends to place responsibilities
more frequently on low-level commanders: They are closer to the par-
ticular combat or field situation and thus have less reason to be igno-
rant of the risks raised "on the spot" by a confluence of factors from
many sources. Also, lower-level officers are less often justified in assum-
ing that other officers are carrying out measures to neutralize such risks.
Rule Four reasserts the balance by providing the incentive of exculpa-
tion to those low-ranking officers who communicate their peculiar
knowledge up the command hierarchy. The provision is not excessively
generous to low-level officers. A notifying officer must admit inability
to eliminate the risk, which may mar his service record, and he typically
will receive from the notified officer detailed instructions to eliminate
risks of crime. Violation of these instructions would of course be a con-
ventional military offense.
The Divorce of Knowledge and Power. A line officer leading his
men on a mission may know that their poor training, their low morale,
and the exigencies of the mission raise unacceptable risks of crime-
but he often will lack the power or legal authority to alter these factors.
With Rule Four's notification provision, knowledge of risks will rise
in the hierarchy to that point where sufficient power resides to elimi-
nate the risk-in the example, to the officer with authority to cancel or
modify the mission. If an officer chooses not to make a notification,
Rule Four presumes conclusively that he has the physical ability and
legal authority to eliminate all xeasonably perceivable, non-negligible
risks of subordinate crime.
If the Rule, instead of requiring notification, directly recognized
excuses of physical inability, superior orders, or military necessity-
or required only "reasonable" or "feasible" intervention-it would pro-
79. To conclude reasonably that the risk of future crimes is only negligible, a com-
mander must have considerable information about precautions taken against such risk.
Note, by contrast, that under Rule Three a commander may safely assume that crimes
are not presently occurring if he is unaware of particular facts indicating the contrary.
Behind tifis distinction are the simple assumptions that criminal activity is the excep-
tion but that, over the long run, such activity will almost surely break out unless pre-
cluded by precautions and safeguards.
1301
The Yale Law Journal
vide no incentive to eliminate risks where knowledge was divorced
from power. A rule could attempt to wed knowledge to power by re-
quiring only that commanders not create risks of subordinate crime.
But the ever-troubled distinction between acts and omissions is pecu-
liarly difficult to apply to command behavior, which typically consists
of complex reactions to fluid situations. Further, since risks of crime
have many causes, a commander may contribute to a risk without hav-
ing reason to know he has done so, and those who cause a risk are not
necessarily well-placed to eliminate it quickly and efficiently. Con-
sistent enforcement of the Rule will induce the military itself to locate
and remedy those basic defects which give rise to unacceptable risks of
subordinate crime.
Multiplicity of Defendants. In some instances a risk will be reason-
ably perceivable at many levels of the command hierarchy. Upon oc-
currence of subordinate crime-unless all officers except the highest
in rank had "notified" their superiors-the prosecutor would have a
long list of possible defendants, and his choice among them would in-
volve criteria never fully advertized and very likely inconsistent from
case to case.
To meet this problem, Rule Four limits prosecution to commanders
who either have received notification or are in immediate charge of the
subordinate committing the war crime. This of course places the obli-
gation to eliminate risks initially upon the immediate superior of
the perpetrator. The provision ensures rapid countermeasures against
risks and a heavy flow of vital information up the hierarchy. Also, that
high-level officers will typically be tried only if they have received noti-
fication from below will greatly simplify adjudication. The notifications
will themselves constitute prima facie evidence that the officer knew
of the unacceptable risk, and the sole question will be whether the
defendant's actions subsequent to notification were such as to render
reasonable his belief that the risk had become only negligibles 0
C. Penalties
Under Rule One, which defines command responsibility as a form
of complicity, punishment may equal that imposed on the subordinate
80. If, instead, prosecution began with the highest ranking commander of the sub-
ordinate perpetrator, each subordinate crime would result in trials of the same high-
level commanders, and many trials would typically be required before a conviction was
attained. If the prosecution were instructed to try the commander who had been "best
able" to eliminate the subordinate crime, the courts would become entangled in weighing
the relative merits and costs of various means of crime suppression.
Note that the proposal in the text narrows-but does not entirely eliminate-prosecu-
torial discretion as to defendant, for in any particular case there may be several com-
manders who have received notifications.
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perpetrator. This is fair because the command omission criminalized
in such a case is a clear moral default. For breach of the other rules,
however, penalties should be quite minor, perhaps only fines and de-
motions. The moral status of the delicts involved is debatable, and high
potential penalties might discourage regular and vigorous enforcement.
Given such enforcement, the penalties need not be draconian to influ-
ence the behavior of career-conscious officers. But, however small, the
penalties should be imposed only by formal and publicized proceed-
ings: To have effect, the rules must be widely understood and seen to
be fair both in theory and practice.
III. Conclusion: Routes to Reform
No international legislature exists to enact these rules, and there is
no international criminal court to adopt them as a "clarification" of
existing law. For the foreseeable future, the laws of war must be re-
formed through the experiments of individual nations.
The rules might become applicable in American courts in several
ways. Military judges might adopt them as plausible interpretations of
the Law of War under Article 18 of the UCMJ, but this is an unpromis-
ing route to reform. Even if the evolution of war crimes law through a
common law process were permitted by the Constitution and facilitated
by a steady flow of cases, rules of the precision and detail outlined
above would take years to develop. Furthermore, the proposed rules
do not pretend accurately to "restate" the international precedents, but
aim rather to replace these with a coherent set of new guidelines. Judi-
cial adoption of the rules as an interpretation of the Law of War would
leave unsettled the conflict between Article 18 and the several specific
crimes created elsewhere in the UCMJ. And the military judiciary
could not on its own eliminate command influence over prosecution
procedures or institute the prosecution priorities proposed in Rule
Four.
Presidential adoption of the rules, while perhaps feasible, also has
drawbacks. The President might simply issue the rules as a general
regulation, binding on military officers as a superior order, or he might
promulgate them as part of the Manual on Courts-Martial, which pro-
vides detailed interpretations of UCMJ offenses. The latter procedure
risks constitutional problems: The Manual can only suggest interpre-
tations of existing crimes, not create new ones."' The proposed rules
81. See Reid v. Covert, .354 US. 1, 38-39 (1957 and Note, Taps for the Real Catch-22,
81 YA.L L.J. 1518, 1523-24 (1972).
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arguably go beyond the international Law of War incorporated in Arti-
cle 18, and almost certainly exceed specific Code provisions relating to
command responsibility. Issuing the rules as a general regulation might
avoid this constitutional obstacle. 2 But command influence over prose-
cution would remain, and the prosecution priorities under Rule Four
would have an uncertain status. Rather than resolving the conflict be-
tween Article 18 and other Code provisions, a general regulation would
provide yet another theory for punishing command delicts, and penal-
ties under this theory would not be graduated according to the rule
breached-all breaches constituting "disobedience" of a lawful order. 83
Finally, the President is himself subject to command responsibility un-
der international law, and the formulation of applicable standards
should not be left to an interested party.
Congressional codification of the rules, as an amendment to the
UCMJ, would meet all of these problems. Such action could simultane-
ously resolve the conflict between Article 18 and specific Code provi-
sions. Several bills have been proposed to establish a prosecutorial
agency for military crimes independent of command influence;8 4 these
could be readily amended to cover war crimes and to establish the
prosecution priorities in Rule Four. Congressional hearings would
provide the open deliberation, and extensive solicitation of expert testi-
mony, which should precede such a major reform.
There is of course no reason for Congress to restrict its attention to
the law on command responsibility. The Indochina experience has
revealed many other defects in war crimes law and in the procedures
established to enforce it.85 The country has understandably rejected
an orgy of war crimes trials as a proper remedy for these defects. But
prospective action remains possible. If the lessons of Indochina are
simply forgotten, future generations may be taught them afresh.
82. See Note, supra note 81, at 1539-40. While, as that Note suggests, Presidents "have
always had inherent power to promulgate military regulations," id., there remains room
for doubt that this power can be used to create elaborate new criminal offenses.
83. Such disobedience would violate Art. 92(1), U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 892(1) (1970),
for which the maximum penalty is two years imprisonment. MCM, Table of Maximum
Punishments, para. 127c, at 25-12.
84. See, e.g., S. 987, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) and S. 1127, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
For discussion of the issues involved see Bayh, The Military Justice Act of 1971: The
Need for Legislative Reform, 10 A-A. CRIm. LAw REV. 9 (1971); De Giulio, Command
Control: Lawful Versus Unlawful Application, 10 SAN DEcO L. REV. 72 (1972); Hodson,
Courts-Martial and the Commander, id. at 51; Quinn, Prosecutorial Discretion: An
Overview of Civilian and Military Characteristics, id. at 36.
85. Among the many areas in need of reform are jurisdictional matters, see note 66
supra, notions of horizontal complicity, see pp. 1293-94 supra, the concept of military
necessity, see note 41 supra, and the legal status of heavy bombing and artillery strikes
in or near populated areas, see T. TAYLOR, NUREt, IBF AND VIETNAMI: AN AMERICAN
TRAcaEY 140-45 (1970).
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